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SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION
IN THE OKLAHOMA STATUTES
By Martin A. Frey
Sex-based discrimination is a double-edged sword.
Men may be discriminated against as well as women.
Statutory sex-based discrimination may take a number
of forms. A statute may be discriminatory on its face, or
a statute not discriminatory on its face may be applied
to facts in a discriminatory fashion or a statute neither
discriminatory on its face nor as applied may reflect,
contribute to, and reinforce existing discriminatory at-
titudes.
This article will focus on sex-based discrimination in
the Oklahoma statutes-discrimination against women
and discrimination against men. The family law statutes
will be used to illustrate the statute discriminatory on its
face and the statute discriminatory as applied. The
statutes regulating professions and occupations will be
used to illustrate the statute that is neither dis-
criminatory on its face nor as applied-but which
reflects, contributes to, and reinforces existing
discriminatory attitudes.
A statute that evidences sex-based discrimination on
its face is the most obvious. The following illustrations
come from four different titles on the Oklahoma stat-
utes: title 10-Children; title 12-Civil Procedure; title
30-Guardian and Ward; and title 32-Husband and
Wife. In title 32, a number of sex-based discrimination
statutes still exist. Section 2, entitled "Husband head of
family," provides:
The husband is the head of the family. He may
choose any reasonable place or mode of living
and the wife must conform thereto.,
This statute, which dates from 1890,2 makes the hus-
band and wife unequal partners in marriage. The man is
superior and therefore is the head. He has the power to
select the place and mode of living. The woman, being
subservient, "must conform thereto. "3
Section 3, entitled "Duty to support," provides:
The husband must support himself and his wife
out of the community property or out of his
separate property by his labor. The wife must sup-
port the husband when he has not deserted her out
of the community property or out of her separate
property when he has no community or separate
property and he is unable from infirmity to sup-
port himself.,
By this statute, the husband has the duty to support
himself but the wife has no parallel duty to support
herself. The husband also has the duty to support his
wife. While the wife has been given a duty to support
her husband, her duty is qualified by three conjunctive
conditions. She has the duty to support her husband
only when he has not deserted her and he has no com-
munity or separate property and he is unable from infir-
mity to support himself. The husband's duty to support
his wife is not conditioned on her lack of community or
separate property or her inability from infirmity to sup-
port herself.
Section 3 placed a third condition on the wife's duty
to support her husband. She has the duty to support him
only when he has not deserted her. Section 3 places no
parallel condition on the husband's duty to support his
wife. Section 11, "Liability on abandonment or separa-
tion by agreement," however, does limit the husband's
duty in desertion type circumstances.
A husband abandoned by his wife is not liable
for her support until she offers to return, unless
she was justified by his misconduct, in abandon-
ing him; nor is he liable for her support when she
is living separate from him, by agreement, unless
such support is stipulated in the agreement.'
When the wife, however, does have the duty to sup-
port her husband, she need only support him out of the
community property or out of her separate property. He
must support her out of the community property or out
of his separate property or by his labor. She is not re-
quired to support him by her labor.6
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Section 10, entitled "Husband bound for necessaries,"
provides:
If the husband neglects to make adequate provi-
sion for the support of his wife, except in the cases
mentioned in [section 11], any other person may,
in good faith, supply her with articles necessary
for her support and recover the reasonable value
thereof from the husband.'
As the title states, section 10 is the husband's liability to
third persons who supply the wife with articles neces-
sary for her support. There is no comparable statute im-
posing liability on the wife to third persons who supply
the husband with articles necessary for his support.'
The divorce and alimony statutes are found in title 12
("Civil Procedure"). Section 1271 lists the grounds for
divorce:
The district court may grant a divorce for any
of the following causes:
Fourth. When the wife at the time of her mar-
riage, was pregnant by another than her
husband.,
There is no ground for divorce based on the fact that at
the time of the marriage a woman other than the wife
was pregnant by the husband.
Section 1278 provides for the "Restoration of wife's
maiden name:"
When a divorce is granted, the wife shall be
restored to her maiden or former name if she so
desires. o
While the tradition has been that upon marriage the wife
takes her husband's surname, it is becoming less than
uncommon for a wife upon marriage to retain her
maiden name. While this statute would not affect the
wife's retention of her former name, it would
discriminate against the man who upon marriage
decides to assume a new name whether it be his wife's
surname, a hyphenated combination of his surname and
his wife's surname, an abbreviated compilation of his
and his wife's surnames, or a new surname. Upon
divorce, section 1278 does not permit the husband to be
restored to his former surname if he so desires.
The statutes concerning the custody of children are
found in several locations in the Oklahoma statutory
compilation. In title 10, entitled "Children," section 5 of
chapter 1, "Custody, services and earnings," provides:
The father of a legitimate unmarried minor
child is entitled to its custody, services and earn-
ings; but he cannot transfer such custody or serv-
ices to any other person except the mother,
without her written consent, unless she has de-
serted him or is living separate from him by agree-
ment. If the father is dead, or be unable or refuse
to take the custody, or has abandoned his family,
the mother is entitled thereto."
This statute states that the mother and father do not
share equally in the custody, services, and earnings of
their children. The father is superior. Only when he is
unable or unwilling does the mother acquire the parental
rights to custody, services, and earnings of her children.
This statute represents the common law position that
the father's right to custody of his legitimate children
was virtually absolute.
This absolute right of the father to the custody of his
children ceases once a petition for divorce, legal separa-
tion, or annulment has been filed. Title 10, chapter 1, sec-
tion 5, must be read in conjunction with title 12 ("Civil
Procedure"), chapter 22 ("Divorce and Alimony"), sec-
tion 1277, which provides for the "Care and custody of
children:""
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"By statute the mother and father do not share equally
in the custody, services, and earnings of their children.
The father is superior. . . the common law position
that the father's right to custody of his legitimate children
was virtually absolute."
A petition or cross-petition for a divorce, legal
separation, or annulment must state whether or
not the parties have minor children of the mar-
riage. If there are such children, the court shall
make provision for guardianship, custody, sup-
port and education of the minor children, and
may modify or change any order in this respect,
whenever circumstances render such change
proper either before or after final judgment in the
action.
But this statute, which gives neither parent a superior
position as to custody of their children, must be read
with title 30, section 11:
In awarding the custody of a minor . the
court or judge is to be guided by the following
considerations:
1. By what appears to be for the best interests of
the child in respect to its temporal and its mental
and moral welfare; and if the child be of sufficient
age to form an intelligent preference, the court or
judge may consider that preference in determining
the question.
2. As between parents adversely claiming the
custody or guardianship, neither parent is entitled
to it as of right, but other things being equal, if the
child be of tender years, it should be given to the
mother; if it be of an age to require education and
preparation for labor or business, then to the
father. 3
Section 6 of title 10, "Custody of illegitimate child,"
states:
The mother of an illegitimate, unmarried minor
is entitled to its custody, services and earnings.14
No parallel provision exists for the father of an il-
legitimate, unmarried minor. For the father to be en-
titled to the custody, services, and earnings of an il-
legitimate, unmarried minor, he must legitimatize the
child. 15
Section 84 provides for "Liability of father for ex-
penses of mother:"
The father of a child born out of wedlock is
liable for the reasonable expenses of the mother
during the period of her pregnancy, confinement
and recovery, whether or not the child is born
alive. This liability may only be enforced within
three years after the birth of the child and, where
the child is born alive, it must be enforced in an
action for the support of the child. 16
This statute places all of the expenses on the father and
none on the mother. Responsibility is not shared.
Section 15, "Support of step-children," provides:
A husband is not bound to maintain his wife's
children by a former husband; but if he receives
them into his family and supports them, it is
presumed that he does so as a parent, and where
such is the case, they are not liable to him for their
support, nor he to them for their services. 7
No parallel provision exists for a wife to maintain her
husband's children by a former wife.
Section 22, entitled "Wife of manager or superin-
tendent of institution having orphans or delinquent
children as employee," provides:
It shall be lawful for the wife of any chief
managing officer or superintendent of any institu-
tion in the State of Oklahoma, the inmates of
which are orphans or delinquent boys and girls to
be also employed at said institution and be carried
on and paid through the pay-roll of said institu-
tion. 18
The statute has no counterpart for the husband of any
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chief managing officer or superintendent of any institu-
tion. As is the case of many sex-based discriminatory
statutes, the discrimination is against both women and
men. This statute assumes that women will not be the
chief managing officer or superintendent of the institu-
tions referred to in the statute. But if a woman does
become the chief managing officer or superintendent,
her husband is not authorized to be employed at that in-
stitution and be carried on and paid through the pay-roll
of that institution.
These statutes demonstrate that facial discriminaton
against both sexes exists in the Oklahoma statutes. We
will focus now on statutes that are discriminatory as ap-
plied.
Divorce and alimony statutes will be used to illustrate
sex-bias application of statutes that evidence no sex-bias
on their faces. As previously discussed the statutes for
custody of children upon a petition for divorce, legal
separataion, or annulment are facially neutral. Neither
parent has preference as to custody but if other things
are equal, the mother will be awarded custody of
children of tender years. 19 In practice, however, before a
mother is deprived of the custody of her children of
tender years, it must clearly appear that she is an im-
proper person to be entrusted with their custody.2o
Sex-based discrimination also occurs in the applica-
tion of the statute concerning the disposition of property
upon divorce.,, The statute divides the property into
three categories: (1) property owned by the husband or
wife before marriage; (2) property acquired after mar-
riage by the husband or wife in his or her own right; and
(3) property acquired by the husband and wife jointly
during their marriage, regardless of whether the title is
in the husband, the wife, or both. As to property in the
first two categories, the statute directs the court to
"enter its decree confirming in each spouse [that] prop-
erty . . . ." As to property in the third category (prop-
erty acquired jointly during marriage), the statute man-
dates the court to "make such division between the par-
ties as may appear just and reasonable, by a division of
the property in kind, or by setting the same apart to one
of the parties, and requiring the other thereof to pay
such sum as may be just and proper to effect a fair and
just division thereof."
Neither sex has received a preference by the wording
of the statute. But sex-based discrimination may occur
when the courts apply the statute to the facts of a given
case. One such problem occurs in the determination of
whether property acquired during the marriage should
be classified as property acquired by one spouse (prop-
erty that remains his or her separate property) or as
property acquired jointly (property that the court will
distribute). A few illustrations will illuminate the
discrimination.
In Baker v. Baker,2 2 throughout 17 years of marriage,
the husband worked at a military career and the wife, at
his request, did not work outside the home. Shortly
before the divorce, he retired from the Army and was
entitled to government retirement benefits. The District
Court classified the retirement benefits as jointly ac-
quried property to be distributed between the husband
and wife. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held the
District Court in error, modified the District Court's
order, and affirmed the order as modified. The retire-
ment benefits were not subject to division by the court
because they were not property acquired jointly during
marriage. The wife's services in the home which enabled
the husband to acquire the retirement benefits went un-
noticed. Nor did the court consider that the wife's
agareement to forego employment which would pro-
duce retirement benefits meant that she was relying on
sharing in her husband's benefits. 23
Sex-based discrimination in classifying property as
jointly acquired is further illustrated by Colvert v. Col-
vert.2 ' The parties were married while both were in
school, he was a graduate student and she was an
undergraduate student. During the early part of the
marriage, the wife continued with her education and
became a registered pharmacist. The husband then
entered medical school and at the time of divorce was six
months from graduation. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court treated the husband's education as jointly ac-
quired property but refused to treat the wife's education
the same. The court then affirmed the trial court's judg-
ment granting the wife a $35,000 property set-
tlement-the property being the husband's education
jointly acquired. The rationale was the different motives
for seeking education. The decision to use the wife's in-
come for the husband's medical education was viewed
as an investment decision. The decision to use the hus-
band's income for the wife's pharmaceutical education
was deemed to emanate from his statutory duty to sup-
port his wife. She had no parallel duty to support him
through medical school. Thus a statute not
discriminatory on its face is discriminatory as applied
since it is read in conjunction with a discriminatory
statute on its face.
Even when property is classified as acquired jointly
during marraige, what criteria will the courts use in
making "such division between the parties as may ap-
pear just and reasonable" and will these criteria reflect
sex-based discrimination? Unlike the division of proper-
ty in a community property system, property acquired
during marriage in a common law state will not be
divided half-and-half. The division is based on the
respective efforts of the parties in contributing to the ac-
cumulation of the jointly acquired property. The court
in Spencer *v. Spencer focused on the following efforts:
The evidence made material by these principles
is that the father is a hard-working, industrious
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"Divorce and alimony statutes... illustrate
sex-bias application of statutes that evidence
no sex-bias on their faces."
man not only holding down a full-time job during
the day, but ordinarily working around the house
at other times either tending a good size garden,
building a new house, or performing other
valuable services. He is frugal, temperate and not
given to riotous living or truant associations.
On the other hand the evidence disclosed that the
mother is somewhat of an economic millstone hanging
on appellant. Neighbors testified that she spent most of
the day (until about 30 minutes before appellant was
due home from work) loafing around the house with
nothing on except a see-through "nightie;" that she
neglected not only her household duties but the two
young boys who were not "kept clean" and were not
given proper meals (cookies before a frequent supper of
"hot dogs" notwithstanding the deep freezer was full of
vegetables grown by the father). There was evidence
that instead of canning or using the produce from ap-
pellant's garden "she would just let it lay in the icebox or
just throw it out."2 5
Aside from Spencer v. Spencer, a system based on
evaluating relative efforts is subject to sex-based
discrimination. Will the best efforts of the spouse out-
side the home, that is, the spouse who is the "bread-
winner," be considered more important than the best ef-
forts of the spouse inside the home? When both spouses
contribute maximum effort to the family, the argument
could and should be made that upon a division of the
property jointly acquired during marriage, the wife and
the husband should share equally.
Sex-based discrimination may occur in the application
of the statute concerning the awarding of alimony upon
divorce. On its face the statute states no sex-based
discrimination:
Either spouse may be allowed such alimony out of
real and personal property of the other as the
court shall think reasonable, having due regard to
the value of such property at the time of the
divorce. Alimony may be allowed from real or
personal property, or both, or in the form of
money judgment, payable either in gross or in in-
stallments, as the court may deem just and
equitable.26
Unlike its predecessor, this statute sanctions alimony for
either spouse and dispenses with the concept of fault.2 1
The discrimination may occur when the statute is ap-
plied to a set of facts arising from a divorce action.
Alimony for support, unlike alimony for property
distribution, is based on the need for support. Factors in
determining need include each spouse's separate estate,
the ability to support him or herself, the ability to pay
alimony, and additional burdens such as support of
children. Need varies depending on the family's life
style. Seldom will the husband be entitled to alimony
for support because he has continuously been employed
outside the home. Many times the wife has given up
employment to stay at home, take care of her family,
and tend the house. She has not been employed outside
the home and the skills that she has will permit her to
enter the "labor" force at only a low level. So in the
traditional marriage it is the wife who is disadvantaged
upon divorce and who can demonstrate the need for
support.
But if the purpose of support is need, then a strong ef-
fort should be made to insure that this need is tem-
porary. If alimony for support is granted only to the
unemployed spouse, then every effort should be made
to provide that spouse with the skills necessary to ac-
quire work and eliminate the need. Discrimination exists
if the spouse receiving alimony for support is not re-
quired to make reasonable efforts to eliminate or at least
reduce his or her inability to support himself or herself.
The third type of discriminatory statute may neither
be discriminatory on its face nor as applied but may
reflect, contribute to, and reinforce existing sex-based
discriminatory attitudes. The following materials move
from the traditional family law statutes-marriage,
divorce, support-to career choices. Title 59 of the
Oklahoma Statutes Annotated is devoted to "Profes-
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"Sex-based discrimination may occur when the courts
apply the statute to the facts of a given case."
sions and Occupations." In this title, thirty-five profes-
sions and occupations-including architects, barbers,
doctors, nurses, plumbers, social workers, and cosme-
tologists-are licensed and regulated.
Searching the statutes for pronoun references revealed
a number of interesting facts. First, no uniform reference
to men and women has been developed. Various pro-
noun references have been used-"he," "he or she," and
"he (she)." Two statutes resolve the pronoun problem
by stating "Masculine words shall include the feminine
and neuter, and the singular includes the plural."" In
many statutes, an attempt has been made to avoid use of
a pronoun and to use instead such terms as "every appli-
cant," "any person," "student," or the name of the oc-
cupation. A few statutes refer at times to "he or she," 29
but most refer only to "he.""o
The lists are revealing as to occupational sex-based
discrimination. Although not all the statutes that make
use of the pronoun "she" are occupations stereotypically
for women, many such as barbering, cosmetology, elec-
trology, and nursing, have been in that category. On the
other hand, only a few statutes that make use of the pro-
noun "he" exclusively are occupations stereotypically
for women. In the medicine and medically related fields,
statutes dealing with dentists and doctors (M.D.s) refer
to "he" while statutes licensing nurses refer to "he or
she." Throughout the statuates on dentistry the
reference is only to the masculine "he." The sex-based
bias is obvious when the statute regulating the unlawful
practice for dentists is compared with the statute
regulating the unlawful practice for dental hygienists.',
The pronoun used for dentists is "he" and that for dental
hygienists is "he or she." Even in those occupational
statutes using the disjunctive "he or she," the disjunctive
is not consistently used. One statute may speak in terms
of "he or she" and another statute dealing with the same
occupation will refer to "he."
The only occupational statutes that do not show this
inherent preference for men are those regulating nurses,
an occupation traditionally classified as for women.
Even within the same statute, the disjunctive "her or
she" is not consistently used. For example the statute for
"Examinations - Qualification of applicants - Fees -
Licenses" for chiropody has nine pronoun
references-seven to "he or she" and two' to "he." 3
Similar patterns exist for other statutes as well: chiro-
practic, cosmetology, optometry and electrology. 1
Section 691, "Practicing veterinary medicine-Who
regarded as-Exceptions," illustrates the existence of in-
ternal inconsistency:
Any person shall be regarded as practicing
Veterinary Medicine, within the meaning of this
Act, who assumes, advertises, or holds himself
out as a veterinary practitioner, or prescribes for,
in any way treats sick, or injured animal or ani-
mals or administers preventive treatment there-
for, to other than his or her own, for compensa-
tion.35
These illustrations are not intended to imply that sex-
based discrimination in certain occupations is sanc-
tioned by statute. Certainly statutes using "he" will be
interpreted to include "he or she." But the statutes foster
what had been occupational sex-based discrimination
and do nothing to counter the old mores. Most occupa-
tional discrimination has been discriminatory against
women but implicit in the statutory pattern is dis-
crimination against men as well. Men seldom enter oc-
cupations stereotyped for women. The statutory
discrimination against men is more subtle since these oc-
cupational statutes may refer to "he or she" and thus ap-
pear to be non-discriminatory. But by considering all of
the "he" statutes and all of the "he or she" statutes, the
"he or she" statutes may really mean "she" alone. Cer-
tain occupations are for men and others are for women
and this pattern, although without sharp boundaries, is
reinforced by statute.
In light of the foregoing, what can be done to combat
sex-based discrimination? Two types of discriminatory
statutes, those discriminatory on their faces and those
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"When both spouses contribute maximum effort to the
family, the argument could and should be made
that upon division of the property
jointly acquired during marriage, the wife and the
husband should share equally."
that reflect, contribute to, and reinforce existing sex-
based discriminatory attitudes, can be corrected with
legislative action. Indeed, the legislature has taken ac-
tion to amend some statutes formerly discriminatory on
their face. For example, until 1975 the statute relating to
support and education of children read:
The parent entitled to the custody of a child
must give him support and education suitable to
his circumstances. If the support and education
which the father of a legitimate child is able to
give are inadequate, the mother must assist him to
the extent of her ability.3 1
This statute was amended in 1975 to read:
The parent entitled to the custody of a child
must give him support and education suitable to
his circumstances. If the support and education
which the parent having custody is able to give
are inadequate, the other parent must assist to the
extent of his or her ability. 3 1
The change was in the second sentence.
If the support and education which the (father of a
legitimate child] parent having custody is able to
give are inadequate, the [mother] other parent
must assist [him] to the extent of his or her ability.
The words bracketed are from the older statute, the
words in boldface are from the newer statute, and the
words neither bracketed nor boldfaced are common to
both statutes. The 1975 changes eliminate most of the
sex-based discrimination of this statute. It is interesting
to note that no change was made in the first sentence
which uses the masculine pronoun when referring to the
child. Certainly this statute is not limited to the support
and education of male children.
A second illustration of legislative activity is the revi-
sion of the alimony for support statute. Prior to 1975,
only the wife could receive alimony for support. The
revision permits alimony for support for either spouse if
he or she demonstrates need." A third change eliminates
the age differentials when dealing with males and
females.39 But what is needed is a uniform revision of all
current legislation discriminating on its face. Piecemeal
revision will be slow and ineffective.
The legislature has yet to take action to correct
statutes that reflect, contribute to, and reinforce existing
sex-based discriminatory attitudes. No attempt has been
made to cull the statutes for the pronoun problem. Even
in recently enacted statutes, the legislature has
demonstrated a lack of awareness of the problem. The
newly enacted statutes basically use the masculine. 0 Oc-
casionally the disjunctive "he or she" will be used in a
statute but the disjunctive is not consistently used. 4' The
job of culling existing statutes can only be long, tedious,
and expensive. But these excuses are inapplicable to new
legislation. A general interpretation statute regarding
pronouns followed by strict adherence to the general
statute would at least resolve the problem as to future
legislation.41
The fact that a statute has been applied in a
discriminatory fashion does not mean that it must con-
tinue to be applied in that fashion. If this statute is so ap-
plied only because it must be read in conjunction with
another statute which is discriminatory on its face, then
the change of the facially discriminatory statute may
resolve the problem. Or a statute may be applied in a
discriminatory fashion due to a lack of awareness that
the statute is being so applied. The consciousness level
of those that draft the statutes, those that apply the
statutes, those that assist in the application of the
statutes, and those to whom the statutes are applied
must continually be raised. Since the turn of the century
much has been done to eradicate discrimination. Much
more remains to be done.
1. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §2 (West 1976). The origin of this statute is
an 1887 Dakota statute.
2. Okla. Stat. ch. 40, §(1890).
3. Does the fact that the husband is the head of the family and selects
the place of living preclude the wife from residing in one state when her
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husband has selected another state as the family residence7 The problem
comes to the fore when a wife seeks divorce in a state which is different
from that in which her husband has chosen to reside. A former
Oklahoma statute provided that:
The plaintiff in an action for divorce must have been an actual
resident, in good faith, of the state, for six (6) months next
preceding the filing of the petition, and a resident of the county
in which the action is brought at the time the petition is filed.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1272 (West 1961). In order to circumvent the
problems created by the husband's selection of the place of residence,
another statute was required:
A wife who resides in this State at the time of applying for a
divorce, shall be deemed a resident of this State, though her hus-
band resides elsewhere.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1286 (West 1961). ("Residence of the wife
when plaintiff").
Both statutes have been updated. Section 1272 now provides:
Either the plaintiff or the defendant in an action for divorce
must have been an actual resident, in good faith, of the State, for
six months next preceding the filing of the petition.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1272 (West Supp. 1977-1978). Section 1286,
has a name change as well as language changes:
A married person who meets the residence requirements
prescribed by law for bringing a divorce action in this State may
seek a divorce in this State, though the other spouse resides
elsewhere.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1286 (West Supp. 1977-1978). ("Residency in
divorce cases" rather than "Residence of the wife when plaintiff.")
4. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §3 (West 1976). Except for the lack of com-
munity property references, the statute remains as it was in 1890:
The husband must support himself and his wife out of his
property or by his labor. The wife must support the husband,
when he has not deserted her, out of her separate property when
he has no separate property and he is unable from infirmity to
support himself.
Okla. Stat. Ch. 40, §3 (1890).
5. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §11 (West 1976). The language of
this statute has remained unchanged since it first appeared in the
Oklahoma statutes in 1890. Okla. Stat. ch. 40, §11 (1890).
6. Section 3 limits the wife's duty to support her husband to
cases when the husband has not deserted her. While section 3
does not limit the husband's duty when his wife has deserted
him, section 11, "Liability on abandonment or separation by
agreement," does limit his duty:
A husband abandoned by his wife is not liable for her support
until she offers to return, unless she was justified by his miscon-
duct, in abandoning him; nor is he liable for her support when
she is living separate from him, by agreement, unless such sup-
port is stipulated in the agreement.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §11 (West 1976).
Limiting the wife's duty to when the husband "is unable from infirmity
to support himself" is common. For example, the new Texas Family
Code provides: "The husband has the duty to support the wife, and the
wife has the duty to support the husband when he is unable to support
himself." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §4.02 (Vernon 1975).
7. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §10 (West 1976). This statute first appeared
as Okla. Stat. ch. 40, §10 (1890).
8. Not all states leave the wife without liability to third persons. For
example, the new Texas Family Code provides: "A spouse who fails to
discharge a duty of support is liable to any person who provides
necessaries to those to whom support is owed." Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§4.02 (Vernon 1975).
9. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1271 (West 1961). This ground for divorce
was not listed in the 1890 statutes as a ground for divorce. Okla. Stat.
ch. 50, art. 2, §2 (1890). It first appeared in 1893.
10. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 §1278 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
11. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, ch. 1, §5 (West Supp. 1977-1978). The
language of this segment of the statute has remained unchanged since
1890. Okla. Stat. ch. 63, §5 (1890). The statute now includes a
paragraph on visitation rights of grandparents.
12. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 §1277 (West Supp. 1977-1978). See, also,
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1275 (West 1961) (Parties in equal
wrong-custody of children-disposition of property); §1277.1 (West
Supp. 1977-1978) (Preference of child); §1277.2 (West Supp. 1977-1978)
(Paternity determined).
13. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, §11 (West 1976).
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14. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §6 (West 1966). This statute first appeared
in 1890. Okla. Stat. ch. 63, §6 (1890). In 1974 the Oklahoma Legislature
enacted section 6.5, "Use of certain words in reference to children born
out of wedlock prohibited."
A. On and after the date upon which this act becomes
operative, the designations "illegitimate" or "bastard" shall not
be used to designate a child born out of wedlock.
B. No person, firm, corporation, agency, organization, the
State of Oklahoma nor any of its agencies, boards, commisison
officers or political subdivisions, nor any hospital, nor any in-
stitution supported by public funds, nor any employee of any of
the above, shall use the term "illegitimate" or 'bastard" in refer-
ring to or designating any child born on or after the operative
date of this act.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §6.5 (West Supp. 1977-1978). After making this
strong statement, the Legislature did not go back to section 6 to revise
the language but left section 6 to refer to illegitimate minors.
15. Section 55 provides for "Adoption of illegitimate child by father:"
The father of an illegitimate child by publicly acknowledging
it as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if
he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it
were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and such child
is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of
its birth. The status thus created is that of a child adopted by
regular procedure of court.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §55 (West 1966).
Or the father could proceed under the Uniform Adoption Act. Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 10 ch. 2A (West Supp. 1977-1978). Section 60.3 states
that:
The following persons are eligible to adopt a child:
(4) In the case of a child born out of wedlock, its unmarried
father or mother.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §60.3 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
The father of a child born out of wedlock is not required to consent to
that child's adoption.
A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent of
its parents, if living, nor a child born out of wedlock without the
consent of its mother, if living.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §60.6 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
16. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §84 (West 1966). This statute is found in
chapter 3 to title 10, "bastardy proceedings." The other title 10 statutes
are in chapter 1, "general provisions." Section 84 dates only back to
1965. 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 378, §4.
17. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §15 (West 1966). The original statute was
Okla. Stat. ch. 63, art. 1, §15 (1890).
18. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §22 (West 1966). This statute dates to
1939. 1939 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 26, art. 2, §1, at 115.
19. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, §11 (West 1976). See text accompanying
notes 12-13 supra.
20. Waller v. Waller, 439 P.2d 952, 956 (Okla. 1968). At the time of
divorce, custody was awarded to the mother: Application of Caldwell,
525 P.2d 641 (Okla. 1974) (4 year old boy); Gilbert v. Gilbert 460 P.2d
929 (Okla. 1969) (7 year old boy). A glance at the cases indicates that
custody will be awarded to the mother unless she is unable to provide
the proper environment for the child. Brim v. Brim, 532 P.2d 1403
(Okla. 1975) (3 year old boy) (mother's home environment considered
immoral by society); Lynn v. Lynn, 443 P.2d 106 (Okla. 1968) (4
children ages 10-16) (mother's living conditions less than adequate);
Nowlin v. Nowlin, 551 P.2d 1177 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (4 children ages
9-17) (mother around late at night).
Because of the sex-based stereotype of family roles, the father and the
mother do not receive equal consideration when the issue is the welfare
of the child-a crucial factor in the custody decision.
21. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1278 (West Supp. 1977-1978). this
method of distribution dates back to 1893. Okla. Stat. ch. 66, §671
(1893).
22. 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1975).
23. The rationale of the Baker decision was based on the interrelation-
ship between property distribution (alimony for property settlement)
and alimony for support:
The nearest this Court has come to answering this question is
the case of Holeman v. Holeman, Okla., 459 P.2d 611, in which
we observed that if the retirement fund is divided at the time of
the divorce as jointly acquired property that this would in effect
destroy the husband's future livelihood and means of complying
with an alimony or (sicl support award. We further observed,
and inferentially approved, that the Trial Court obviously took
into consideration the retirement fund in regard to setting an
award of alimony for support out of the husband's future in-
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come or earning capacity . . . . All of the cases cited in the an-
notation of Heuchan v. Heuchan, [22 A.L.R. 2d 1410], are to the
effect that pension of a husband may be considered in determin-
ing amount of alimony for support. All of these cases would, by
implication, rule out the consideration of a pension as property
acquired during coverture and subject to division between the
parties.
Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Okla. 1975). Granted that future
income or earning capacity of the spouse paying alimony should be con-
sidered in the alimony for support decision, the sequence of decisions
should be reversed. First the jointly acquired property should be divided
and then the decision should be made on alimony for support. The de-
cision on alimony for support should not affect the decision categorizing
property as individually or jointly acquired. The Baker decision certain-
ly discriminates against the spouse who performs the duties that have
been stereotyped for women-that is housework. This occupation
generates neither wages nor a pension.
On first reading, it may appear that the spouse without the pension
will acquire a share of the pension whether her or his interest is labeled
alimony for support or alimony for property settlement. But this will not
hold true for all cases. Death or remarriage of the recipient may ter-
minate alimony for support but not alimony for property settlement.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1289B (West Supp. 1977-1978).
Weaver v. Weaver 545 P.2d 1305 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975), is
distinguishable on its facts. Here the parties were married in 1953, per-
manently separated in 1966, and the husband was captured by the North
Vietnamese in 1968 and released in 1973. The divorce was granted later
in 1973. The husband's POW Fund was properly classified as his
separate property since, prior to his capture, the parties had agreed on
separation. From the point of their agreed separation, the affairs and
property of each spouse were handled separately and no property was
acquired by their joint industry. The husband's pension in Baker was ac-
quired by their joint industry.
24. 568 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1977).
25. 567 P.2d 112, 115-16 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977). Even with this
disproportionate lack of effort, the wife fared well. She was awarded a
property settlement of $7,500 or 43% of the $17,300 net joint assets.
26. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1278 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
27. The prior statute read:
When a divorce shall be granted by reason of the fault or ag-
gression of the husband, the wife . . . . shall be allowed such
alimony out of the husband's real and personal property as the
court shall think reasonable, having due regard to the value of
his real and personal estate at the time of said divorce; which
alimony may be allowed to her in real or personal property, or
both, or by decreeing to her such sum of money, payable either
in gross or in installments, as the court may deem just and
equitable ....
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1278 (West 1961). This statute dates back to
1893. Okla. Stat. ch. 66, §671 (1893). The statute concludes with the
statement:
In case of a finding by the court, that such divorce should be
granted on account of the fault or aggression of the wife, the
court may set apart to the husband and for the support of the
children, issue of the marriage, such portion of the wife's
separate estate as may be proper.
Therefore the husband could not be granted alimony but only child sup-
port. Poloke v. Poloke, 370kla. 70, 130 P. 535 (1913), supports the con-
clusion that the legislature intended to disallow a husband alimony.
The new version of §1278 became effective October 1, 1975.
28. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, ch. 8, §353.1 (10) (West 1974) (Drugs and
Pharmacy), and ch. 20, §858-102 (6) (West Supp. 1977-1978) (Real State
License Code).
29. Architects.................................ch. 2 (1947)
Barbers .................................. ch.3(1931)
C hiropody.....................................ch. 4 (1955)
Chiropractic .................................. ch. 5 (1921)
Cosmetology .................................. ch. 6 (1968)
Nurses.................................ch. 12 (1953)
O ptom etry...................................ch. 13 (1937)
Veterinarians ................................. ch. 15 (1953)
Electrology...................................ch. 19 (1947)
Sanitarians...................................ch. 22 (1953)
30. Accountancy .................................. ch. 1 (1968)
D entistry........... .......................... ch. 7 (1970)
Embalmers & Funeral
Directors ................................. ch. 9 (1963)
Engineering............................. .ch. 10 (1968)
Medicine..................... ........... ch. 11 (1965)
The Oklahoma Bar fournal
Osteopathy............... ............... ch. 14 (1921)
Healing Arts.... ......................... ch. 16 (1937)
Physical Therapy ..................... . .ch. 21 (1965)
Optical Goods & Devices,
Sales of ........................ ......... ch. 24 (1953)
Public Auction Law................... ..... ch. 26 (1955)
Plumbers & Plumbing
Contractors........................... ch. 27 (1955)
Water & Sewage Works
Operators............................ch. 29 (1959)
Foresters ............ ch. 31 (1963)
Social Workers........................... ch. 32 (1965)
Bail Bondsmen &
Runners.................. ........... ch. 33 (1966)
Psychology..............................ch. 34 (1965)
Junk Dealers........ ............... ch. 35 (1967)
Polygraph Examiners Act .................... ch. 36 (1971)
Pawnbrokers........ ..................... ch. 37 (1972)
Hearing Aid Dealers &
Fitters ................................... ch. 38 (1973)
Speech Pathology &
Audiology Licensing Act.................ch. 39(1973)
The dates are included in the listing to demonstrate that the use of one
pronoun or another is unrelated to the date of enactment.
31. Compare Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59 (West 1974): §328.28 with
§328.29.
32. Compare Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59 (West 1974): §45.2 with 45.4;
§73 with §72; §143 with §146; §163 with §164d; §328.21 with §328.29;
§585 with §587; §677 with §684; and §804 with §806.
33. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, §144 (West 1974).
34. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, §§163 (chiropractic), 199.1
(cosmetology), 584 (optometry), 809 (electrology) (West 1974).
35. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, §691 (West 1974) (Emphasis added).
36. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, ch. 1, §4 (West 1966).
37. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, ch. 1, §4 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
38. Compare Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1278 (West. Supp. 1977-1978),
with §1278 (West 1961).
39. For example, the statute dealing with dependent and delinquent
children provided:
For the purpose of this Article the words "dependent child" and
"neglected child" shall mean any male child under the age of six-
teen years and any female child under the age of eighteen years
who . . . . The words "delinquent child" shall include any male
child under the age of sixteen years and any female child under
the age of eighteen years who ....
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §101 (West 1966). This statute was repealed as
of January 13, 1969, and a uniform age was used:
When used in this act, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) The term "child" means any person under the age of
eighteen (18) years.
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §1101 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
The marriage laws also have been changed. The statute that once
read, "Any unmarried male of the age of twenty-one (21) years or up-
wards, or any unmarried female of the age of eighteen (18) years or up-
wards" now reads, "Any unmarried person of the age of eighteen (18)
years or upwards .... " Compare Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §3 (West
1954), with §3 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
40. A survey of a recent issue of the Oklahoma Session Law Service
revealed that statutes are currently being drafted in the masculine with
references to "he," "him," "his," "policemen," and "ex-servicemen." 1978
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. chs. 1-310.
41. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, ch. 1, §4 (West Supp. 1977-1978): 1978
Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94, §3 (4).
42. The Uniform Commercial Code §1-102 (5) employs the general
provision:
(5) In this Act unless the context otherwise requires
(b) words in the masculine gender include the feminine and the
neuter, and when the sense so indicates words of the neuter
gender may refer to any gender.
The provisions in article I apply to all the articles of the Code. Several of
the chapters in the occupational statutes used a similar provision:
"Masculine words shall include the feminine and neuter, and the singular
includes the plural." See note 28, supra. No general interpretation provi-
sion exists for the Oklahoma Statutes. A general interpretation provision
would avoid the contention that some crimes as the statute is drawn,
could only be committed by men. See 1978 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch.
121 (crimes and offenses-lewdness and obscenity).
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